gstar288
In late October, India and China finalized a deal to pull back troops from two key Himalayan flashpoints in eastern Ladakh. This was a welcome reprieve after over 20 rounds of often lackluster, grim-appearing negotiations and no letup in Chinese transgressions (for example, in Tawang and Barahoti ). Soon after the agreement was reached, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, and signaled their evolving political intent for “peace and stability” after maintaining a cold shoulder for almost half a decade. A formal dialogue had eluded them since the much-hyped but ultimately deceptive meeting in Mamallapuram in October 2019. These signs of an apparent thaw have sent political commentators into a tizzy. The new announcement appeared jarring to some, mainly because a month earlier, in September, Modi was hobnobbing with the outgoing U.S. President Joe Biden in his hometown of Wilmington, Delaware for the all-important Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.) leaders’ summit – a mainstay for the four members and other stakeholders’ Indo-Pacific visions and strategies. For China, the Quad is a true embodiment of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific construct. Beijing’s perception of the grouping has evolved from dismissing it as easily dissipated “ sea foam ” to seeing the Quad as an “ anti-China ” bloc fostering regional divisiveness. India’s precarious China-U.S. balancing act will get a fresh twist in the coming months with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, who, in his first term as president, famously got along with strongman Modi, reportedly having picked well-known “China hawks” for top diplomatic roles in his incoming administration. India’s diplomatic prescience, or at least deftness, becomes all the more vital when viewed through the prism of global leaders (from Europe to East Asia ) who have proclaimed the accelerating trends toward multipolarity – a multipolar Asia and world ranks high among India’s foreign policy priorities, too. So does the China-India thaw, along with India’s redoubled participation in China-dominant non-Western forums like the newly expanded BRICS summit, indicate India’s intention to reduce its tilt to the West, particularly the United States? And more importantly, what does this mean for India and its Indo-Pacific priorities? India’s priorities for the Indo-Pacific order align with its outlook that a multipolar Asia is the best paradigm for peace and stability. In that vision, an economically developed and strong India is critical. It is precisely this dual track of a multipolar Indo-Pacific and a strong India that the country pursues across virtually all wind directions and strategic sectors. In the Tussle for Multi/Bipolarity, the Indo-Pacific Remains the Focus In the growing bipolar dynamics between the United States and China amid the high stakes high-tech rivalry, India’s attempts toward a “multi-aligned” strategic rebalancing are gaining ground. Even though China is still India’s top trading partner , the former is a continuing perceived threat along the Himalayan border and in the maritime domain, particularly in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), the recent thaw notwithstanding. As a result, as part of its objective to strengthen itself, India has solidified its technological, defense, and security ties with China’s primary rival, the United States. Be it launching the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology ( iCET ) and the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem ( INDUS-X ), expanding bilateral and multilateral maritime exercises, building a joint semiconductor fabrication plant, conducting collaborative research in the outer space sector, creating critical minerals supply chains , or cooperating on emerging digital technologies in Asia and Africa, the U.S. has in the Biden years perhaps become India’s most valuable partnership. Indeed, as a coercive actor in the region and a (perceived) threat to India, China has been a central aspect of this partnership. At the same time, India has diversified its engagements by strengthening economic and trade, diplomatic, digital (including critical technologies such as semiconductors), and maritime security cooperation with various countries. Mainly, India has actively pursued ties with “like-minded” Indo-Pacific stakeholders. India has tightened cooperation with partners like Australia, the European Union, European major powers like France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the U.K.; Japan, the Philippines, South Korea (though ties have not fulfilled their potential despite much ado), and Vietnam. India has also reached out to technological superpower Taiwan, although that marks a redline with China, and so the budding strategic outreach would be tricky. This pursuit of varied partners – all efforts to promote multipolarity – is as much to counter the bipolar compulsions due to the China-U.S. rivalry as to counter China’s growing footprint in India’s backyard of South Asia and the IOR. Europe Is a Flourishing and Fast-Growing Pivot In that vein, India’s still-evolving outreach to various parts of Europe, including the EU and its members, and recent concerted wooing of Southeast Asian states like Singapore and the relevant regional multilateral organizations are particularly noteworthy among India’s outreach activities. As China’s growing coercion against states, including in Europe and Asia, has intensified, European partners, particularly the EU, have looked to strengthen their Indo-Pacific strategies. India has seized the moment to become Europe’s top priority. India has boosted its links to all parts of Europe through high-level engagements, including Modi’s visits to Italy, Poland, Greece, Ukraine, Austria, and Denmark (for the Nordic summit ), to name a few in the last couple of years. Notably, India’s diplomacy is not limited just to the traditional partnerships, say with France or Germany – although the latter have not lost space in India’s diplomacy, as is evident from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz ’s recent India visit, for example. The results have been mixed. The launch of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has been historic, and enhanced coordination, including new collaborations (for example, on recycling e-vehicle batteries ), has come up. New high-tech-oriented economic ties, including on semiconductors , with the EU will also enable India to give impetus to its economic superpower potential . Moreover, India has been able to push for connectivity initiatives via the EU’s Global Gateway, including the collaboration with the European Investment Bank (EIB). Yet, as the ongoing negotiations for the India-EU free trade agreement (FTA) suggest, more must be done to mitigate fundamental differences and boost political will. Notably, India needs to work with the EU, a reliable bloc with high-tech capabilities, on climate action and innovation and regional economic integration in India’s immediate neighborhood and Southeast Asia, where China has tremendous clout. This will benefit the partners economically and strengthen the Indo-Pacific order without resorting to obvious moralizing. But the Core Lies in Modi’s Southeast Asia Pitch Since his first term of “Acting East,” Modi has been vocally ambitious about Southeast Asia, even if linkages may not have lived up to his vision yet. Modi sought to primarily draw on the historical and cultural linkages between South Asia (south India) and Southeast Asia. The two regions, however, famously lack integration despite booming potential – as per a 2022 World Bank report , trade linkages between the two subregions grew about nine-fold over the past two decades, from $38 billion in 2000 to $349 billion in 2018. As a dialogue partner and comprehensive strategic partner of the the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as an East Asia Summit ( EAS ) member, India has been constantly championing ASEAN centrality in its Indo-Pacific outlook on order. Yet the potential has not been fully tapped . Nonetheless, Modi’s recent visits to Singapore and Brunei highlighted good tidings regarding future-oriented diplomatic, economic, and strategic ties between India and ASEAN states in the Indo-Pacific. In Brunei , India upgraded ties, deepening cooperation in defense, trade, investment, technology, renewables, climate change, and regional security avenues. In Singapore , the so-called gateway to Southeast Asia, India showcased that its ambition to build itself as a manufacturing hub in the new digital era would necessitate strategically incorporating Southeast Asian states into the mix, as evidenced by the India-Singapore Semiconductor Ecosystem Partnership. Moreover, Vietnam and the Philippines’ upswing in defense cooperation with India, including arms sales, indicates that bonding over the perceived threat from China as a common factor will impact their ties going forward. India’s tacit support of the Philippines and evolution in its South China Sea stance highlight the regional “ convergence of interests ,” particularly India’s growing stress on the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific. Building Tricky Bridges? Notably, Modi, in recent times, has also shown a penchant for embracing contrasting worldviews. He has courted Russian President Vladimir Putin and extended a historic outreach to Ukraine by visiting the two warring states back to back. The former move expectedly drew criticism in Kyiv and the West, but the overall strategy has, to an extent, worked for India. It is important to note that amid the geopolitical contest between Russia and the West, India has not isolated Russia as a vital partner. At the same time, India’s relationship with Russia is not a strategic priority , “with the primary focus instead being strategic maintenance rather than elevating relations.” In West Asia, too, although commentators have called out India for tacitly backing Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Modi has equally reached out to the Palestinian leadership . Undoubtedly, India’s engagement with Israel has, in the last decade, become well-rounded (from defense to innovation), without New Delhi shying away from showcasing its interests beyond the ideological . Yet, the political tightrope has not been discarded: there is continued emphasis on a “two-state solution,” ceasefire, and a return to diplomacy and dialogue. Moreover, India’s ties with the other states of West Asia are historically high, from the cross-sectoral comprehensive strategic partnership with the UAE to India and Iran signing a 10-year deal on Chabahar despite India’s potential risk of embroiling in U.S. sanctions. With China having expanded its strategic footprint in West Asia (exemplified by the brokering of the Iran-Saudi Arabia deal), India has displayed more foresight in multipolarizing this region. India’s Strategy Makes Sense Keeping Trump’s last term and his “ transactional diplomacy ” in mind, it is apparent that the push for multilateralism seen in Biden’s term (“ restoring American engagement internationally ”) will give way to enhanced focus on bilateralism and minilateralism – championing the values of the so-called “ multilateralism à la carte .” Even as India has been a fervent proponent of effective multilateralism via reforms in multilateral institutions, a minilateral approach suits India just fine. For example, India has effectively utilized the Quad – rejuvenated under Trump 1.0 – to expand its global profile and provide momentum for developing a credible security mechanism in the Indo-Pacific. Flexible arrangements like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity ( IPEF ), which is not an FTA, have also allowed India to push for interests-based goals such as strengthening supply chains , while opting out of the IPEF’s trade pillar. At the same time, India’s proactive participation in U.S.-led initiatives like Quad and non-Western forums like BRICS – the latter are expanding amid a void of functioning multilateralism – ultimately highlights its broadened appeal. Against that overall scenario, a question also arises: whether India will be willing to leverage its new apparent softening toward China – another strong Global South leader with a broader appeal – as part of India’s deft balancing act between the West/North and the East/South. It is clear that the China-India hostilities are unlikely to cease, nor is India’s aversion to Xi’s controversial mega-project of the Belt and Road Initiative going to change. Nonetheless, that the two regional rivals have already cooperated as founding members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), among other fora, highlights the unpredictability and flexibility of global transactional politics. Trump’s reemergence will only strengthen such maneuvers. By and large, India’s approaches to fostering the Indo-Pacific order align with its outlook that a multipolar Indo-Pacific that includes a strong India is the bedrock for peace and stability. In that vein, India’s modus operandi blends realpolitik and flexible diplomacy – and who could fault that? This work is part of a Stiftung Mercator-funded project titled “ Order in the Indo-Pacific : Gauging the Region’s Perspectives on EU Strategies and Constructive Involvement.” The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of Stiftung Mercator or the authors’ respective institutes.
INDIANAPOLIS (AP) — There's more than just school pride and bragging rights to all that bellyaching over who might be in and who might be out of college football 's first 12-team playoff. Try the more than $115 million that will be spread across the conferences at the end of the season, all depending on who gets in and which teams go the farthest. According to the College Football Playoff website , the 12 teams simply making the bracket earn their conferences $4 million each. Another $4 million goes to conferences whose teams get into the quarterfinals. Then, there's $6 million more for teams that make the semifinals and another $6 million for those who play for the title. Most of this bonanza comes courtesy of ESPN, which is forking over $1.3 billion a year to televise the new postseason. A lot of that money is already earmarked — more goes to the Big Ten and Southeastern Conference than the Big 12 or Atlantic Coast — but a lot is up for grabs in the 11 games that will play out between the opening round on Dec. 20 and the final on Jan. 20. In all, the teams that make the title game will bring $20 million to their conferences, all of which distribute that money, along with billions in TV revenue and other sources, in different ways. In fiscal 2022-23, the Big Ten, for instance, reported revenue of nearly $880 million and distributed about $60.5 million to most of its members. The massive stakes might help explain the unabashed lobbying coming from some corners of the football world, as the tension grows in advance of Sunday's final rankings, which will set the bracket. Earlier this week, Big 12 commissioner Brett Yormark lit into the selection committee, which doesn't have a single team higher than 15 in the rankings. That does two things: It positions the Big 12 as a one-bid league, and also threatens to makes its champion — either Arizona State or Iowa State — the fifth-best among conference titlists that get automatic bids. Only the top four of those get byes, which could cost the Big 12 a spot in the quarterfinals — or $4 million. “The committee continues to show time and time again that they are paying attention to logos versus resumes,” Yormark said this week, while slamming the idea of teams with two losses in his conference being ranked worse than teams with three in the SEC. The ACC is also staring at a one-bid season with only No. 8 SMU inside the cut line of this week's projected bracket. Miami's loss last week all but bumped the Hurricanes out of the playoffs, a snub that ACC commissioner Jim Phillips said left him “incredibly shocked and disappointed." “As we look ahead to the final rankings, we hope the committee will reconsider and put a deserving Miami in the field," Phillips said in a statement. The lobbying and bickering filters down to the campuses that feel the impact. And, of course, to social media. One of the most entertaining episodes came earlier this week when athletic directors at Iowa State and SMU went back and forth about whose team was more deserving. There are a few stray millions that the selection committee cannot really influence, including a $3 million payment to conferences that make the playoff. In a reminder that all these kids are going to school, after all, the conferences get $300,000 per football team that meets academic requirements to participate in the postseason. (That's basically everyone). Get poll alerts and updates on the AP Top 25 throughout the season. Sign up here . AP college football: https://apnews.com/hub/ap-top-25-college-football-poll and https://apnews.com/hub/college-football
Los Angeles Lakers @ Phoenix Suns Current Records: Los Angeles 10-6, Phoenix 9-7 When: Tuesday, November 26, 2024 at 10 p.m. ET Where: Footprint Center -- Phoenix, Arizona TV: TNT Follow: CBS Sports App Online Streaming: Catch select NBA matches on Fubo (Try for free. Regional restrictions may apply.) Ticket Cost: $20.00 The Phoenix Suns will take on the Los Angeles Lakers at 10:00 p.m. ET on Tuesday at Footprint Center after having had a few days off. The Suns are limping into the contest on a five-game losing streak. Last Wednesday, the Suns lost to the Knicks at home by a decisive 138-122 margin. The loss doesn't tell the whole story though, as several players had good games. One of the most active was Devin Booker, who posted 33 points along with five assists. His performance made up for a slower match against the Magic last Monday. Even though they lost, the Suns were working as a unit and finished the game with 30 assists. That strong performance was nothing new for the team: they've now posted at least 25 assists in three consecutive matchups. Meanwhile, the point spread may have favored the Lakers last Saturday, but the final result did not. Their bruising 127-102 defeat to the Nuggets might stick with them for a while. The game marked Los Angeles' lowest-scoring contest so far this season. Phoenix's loss dropped their record down to 9-7. As for Los Angeles, this is the second loss in a row for them and nudges their season record down to 10-6. Looking ahead, the Suns are the favorite in this one, as the experts expect to see them win by three points. Bettors picking them against the spread have some confidence (to put it mildly), as the team is sitting on a three-game streak of failing to cover when playing at home. The Suns didn't have too much breathing room in their match against the Lakers in their previous meeting back in October, but they still walked away with a 109-105 victory. Will the Suns repeat their success, or do the Lakers have a better game plan this time around? We'll find out soon enough. Phoenix is a 3-point favorite against Los Angeles, according to the latest NBA odds . The oddsmakers had a good feel for the line for this one, as the game opened with the Suns as a 2-point favorite. The over/under is 234 points. See NBA picks for every single game, including this one, from SportsLine's advanced computer model. Get picks now . Los Angeles has won 6 out of their last 10 games against Phoenix. Oct 28, 2024 - Phoenix 109 vs. Los Angeles 105 Oct 25, 2024 - Los Angeles 123 vs. Phoenix 116 Feb 25, 2024 - Phoenix 123 vs. Los Angeles 113 Jan 11, 2024 - Phoenix 127 vs. Los Angeles 109 Dec 05, 2023 - Los Angeles 106 vs. Phoenix 103 Nov 10, 2023 - Los Angeles 122 vs. Phoenix 119 Oct 26, 2023 - Los Angeles 100 vs. Phoenix 95 Apr 07, 2023 - Los Angeles 121 vs. Phoenix 107 Mar 22, 2023 - Los Angeles 122 vs. Phoenix 111 Dec 19, 2022 - Phoenix 130 vs. Los Angeles 104
Saudi Arabia to launch world's longest driverless metro systemPride, bragging rights and more than $115M at stake when final college playoff rankings come outBIG TEN THIS WEEK
Nearly half of US teens are online ‘constantly,’ Pew report finds49 Gift Ideas For Anyone Who Still Has A Birthday Before The Year Ends
Funeral of young man (18) who died in Donegal crash hears he was full of life and a talented sportsman
No. 19 Illinois 75, Md.-Eastern Shore 55Review: The Anker Solix C300 rewrites the compact portable power station rule book
The Jasper Recovery Coordination Centre is reporting that site servicing is nearing completion for future interim housing sites. Michal Fark, municipal director of recovery, told council on Tuesday (Dec. 3) that they have done as much servicing at the in-town sites as possible in absence of knowing what will actually be placed on the land. “Once we actually further clarify with the Government of Alberta on what will be procured and what will be placed where, then we will have to do some additional servicing and connection work with those structures,” Fark said. In October, the Alberta government committed $112 million toward interim housing for Jasper residents who lost their homes in the wildfire. The funding will go toward building 250 modular homes. Jason Nixon, minister of Seniors, Community and Social Services, confirmed in the legislature on Nov. 28 that they were on track to create 250 new homes just after Christmas. Coun. Scott Wilson asked Fark if the province would be able to make good on this promise. “There’s quite a bit of vagueness to the interim housing,” Wilson said. “We should be transparent with our community that we don’t really know what’s coming, and if our residents have any opportunity in finding accommodation elsewhere, I think they should be doing that.” Fark replied they were still in discussions with the province about what the built form would look like and the timeline of deployment, although 80 to 100 units were previously anticipated for January, with the rest coming later. “At this moment in time, I still see a pathway to 80 to 100 units being delivered sometime relatively early in the New Year, but it is a challenging pathway for sure, and the longer we go without certainty, the narrower that pathway becomes,” he said. Fark added they were meeting with federal and provincial partners later this week to further discuss the timeline for interim housing. Interim housing will be located at the northeast end of town and on the southern end of town along Connaught Drive. A site called 2B just south of Highway 16 was also slated for interim housing, but an impact assessment has determined this site was unviable. Fark said they were working with Parks Canada to identify other sites. Coun. Rico Damota noted there was some frustration in the community about the slow progress with interim housing and asked how many hectares were still available following the removal of site 2B. According to Fark, this resulted in a loss of 3.5 hectares of land, leaving just more than four hectares on the available sites within town. If the province opted for higher density, there could be up to 80 units per hectare. “We have strongly communicated with the Government of Alberta the need to achieve higher entities, and they are working with us, and we are having those ongoing conversations,” he said. Coun. Wendy Hall asked how residents could apply to get on the waitlist for interim housing. Fark replied they were still working with the province on a prioritization matrix that has not been finalized, and a housing application form was still on the municipality’s website. “We know that the demand will exceed what we’re going to be able to supply with the interim housing program,” he added. “Essentially, once we know how many units we are getting and how soon we can anticipate them, then we will go through the prioritization matrix, and that is what will be used to determine who has the first opportunity for the interim housing.”